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Nascent entrepreneurs are frequently advised to “get out of the building” and consult with 
customers before any serious efforts to develop a new product or service are undertaken so they 
can understand what their potential customers really want/need. Despite the intuitive nature of 
this advice, it lacks theoretical and empirical bases. As such, the worldwide popularity of the 
movements this approach has spawned, such as Customer Development and Lean Startup, seems 
to rest on the unfounded assumption that the benefits of involving customers outweighs the costs. 
Thus, we theorize about the pros and cons of involving customers early on in the startup process 
and empirical test our model using data from the PSED II. Our findings suggest that while 
involving customers early will help entrepreneurs create offerings customers are willing to pay 
for, it also results in potentially costly delays in the launch of those offerings. We also find that 
these benefits and costs are magnified when innovativeness is high. 
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Given that new venture survival and growth are related to the knowledge entrepreneurs 
gain throughout the startup process (Bird, 1988; Gartner et al., 1999; Honig, 2001; McMullan 
and Long, 1990), it is no surprise that successful entrepreneurs have been characterized in the 
academic literature as “exceptional learners” (Smilor, 1997). Consistent with this perspective, 
Steve Blank (2006) famously advocated that entrepreneurs are best-served by learning first-hand 
from customers about their wants (a demand-driven construct referring to problems that the 
customer has asked to be solved (Dimov, 2007a)) and needs (a supply-driven construct referring 
to problems of which the customer is unaware (Dimov, 2007a)) given his contention that it is 
only by acquiring this knowledge that entrepreneurs can effectively iterate toward a 
product/service that actually solves a genuine customer problem. To this end, Blank (2013), and 
others who have since adopted and advocated this logic (e.g., Ries, 2011), contend that all 
nascent entrepreneurs – not only those founding high-growth tech ventures but also those 
operating “Main Street” small businesses – should “get out of the building” and consult with 
customers before any serious efforts to develop a new product or service are undertaken.  
Despite the intuitive nature of this advice, most research on customer involvement has 
focused on established firms (e.g., Cui & Wu, 2016; Feng et al., 2016; Lau, 2011; Lin et al., 
2010; Sun et al., 2010), leaving its role in early-stage entrepreneurial ventures unaddressed. This 
lack of a robust theoretical foundation for and empirical evidence of the efficacy of customer 
involvement during the startup phase is troubling as it suggests that the prevailing advice for 
nascent entrepreneurs to get out of the building and talk to customers, as advocated by the 
Customer Development (Blank, 2006) and Lean Startup (Ries, 2011) approaches that have been 
adopted by business schools, incubators, and accelerators around the globe (Mansoori, Karlsson, 
2 
 
and Lundqvist, 2019; York and Danes, 2014), rests on the tenuous assumption that doing so not 
only yields tangible benefits, but also outweighs any costs. To be clear, we are not suggesting 
that involving customers is an unwise strategy out of hand. We are, however, arguing that this 
approach must be justified on theoretical and empirical grounds before we accept it as valid 
(Fredriksen and Brem, 2017; Shepherd and Gruber, 2020). In making this argument, we note an 
emergent stream of research that has begun to empirically explore, primarily with qualitative and 
descriptive methods, the application of the Lean Startup approach by entrepreneurial ventures. 
While this research has provided insight into how startups learn about, implement (Mansoori, 
2017), and benefit from (Ghezzi, 2018) the Lean Startup approach as a whole, it is as of yet 
silent on the specific role that customer involvement (the central component of this approach) 
plays in helping startups develop products and services that real customers actually end up 
buying. Given the important role revenues play in generating the cash flows necessary for the 
emergence, growth, and survival of nascent ventures (Lichtenstein, Dooley, and Lumpkin, 2006), 
we quantitatively examine the role customer involvement plays in the creation of new ventures.  
In undertaking this agenda, we leverage the academic literature on entrepreneurial 
learning to hypothesize whether and under what conditions nascent entrepreneurs ought to 
involve customers. We then test our hypotheses by analyzing data from the PSED II. Our 
findings suggest that involving customers increases the likelihood of making a sale and decreases 
the speed to making that sale, and that both relationships are magnified the more innovative the 
offering. Based on our results, we conclude that involving customers early in the startup process 
is best viewed as a context-specific strategy and not a one-size-fits-all approach.  
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2. Entrepreneurial learning 
While Grant (1997: 451) argues that all firms “must specialize in knowledge acquisition,” 
doing so is particularly critical for nascent entrepreneurs given their lack of resources in general 
(Aldrich, 2000) and the importance of knowledge in identifying and exploiting viable 
opportunities in particular (Ozgen and Baron, 2007; Politis, 2005). For this reason, Alvarez and 
Busenitz (2001: 760) maintain that an entrepreneur’s knowledge serves as the venture’s “critical 
intangible resource.” Yet, because the information upon which knowledge is built is unevenly 
distributed (Hayek, 1945), most entrepreneurs enter the startup process “in a substantial learning 
situation” (Gibb and Ritchie, 1982: 35). According to Politis (2005: 401) entrepreneurial learning 
is “a continuous process that facilitates the development of necessary knowledge for being 
effective in starting up and managing new ventures.” Since individuals enter entrepreneurship 
from a variety of path dependent histories, learning enables each entrepreneur to update his/her 
prior knowledge base with new information and experiences (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001). In 
support of the importance of learning, research suggests that new venture performance is related 
not only to the entrepreneur’s knowledge at the onset of venture creation efforts, but also the 
additional knowledge s/he gains throughout the startup process (Bird, 1988; Gartner et al., 1999; 
Honig, 2001; McMullan and Long, 1990). Given the benefits associated with acquiring new 
knowledge, entrepreneurial success has been attributed to learning in both the academic literature 
– “effective entrepreneurs are exceptional learners” (Smilor, 1997) – and the popular press – 
“winners live by a process of customer learning and discovery” (Blank, 2006: iii). 
2.1. The benefits of learning from customers 
While entrepreneurs can learn from a variety of individuals, such as mentors (e.g., Ozgen 
and Bandura, 2007), role models (e.g., Van Auken, Fry, and Stevens, 2006), experts (e.g., 
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Mansoori, 2017), and venture capitalists (e.g., Baum and Silverman, 2004), we focus on 
customers given Steve Blank’s contention that because only customers possess the information 
(consciously or otherwise) about what they actually want and need, the only way to learn what to 
sell to them is by talking with them. According to Blank (2013: 67), a main problem with 
traditional product development models is that they rarely seek input from the customers; thus, 
“after months or even years of development, entrepreneurs learn the hard way that customers do 
not need or want most of the product’s features.” As such, he advocates a Customer 
Development approach whereby entrepreneurs learn first-hand from customers about their wants 
and needs so that they can develop a solution to a genuine customer problem. 
Eric Ries, one of Blank’s students at UC Berkeley, was greatly influenced by this 
Customer Development framework. By synthesizing it with insights from lean manufacturing, 
design thinking, agile development, and his own entrepreneurial experiences, Ries (2009) 
developed the Lean Startup approach, which is centered around the notion that entrepreneurs 
“must learn what customers really want, not what they say they want or what we think they 
want” (Ries, 2011: 38). In other words, given that customers possess knowledge about which 
entrepreneurs can only speculate – namely, whether and to what degree a product/service in 
development can actually solve a customer problem – involving customers early on during 
product development should make it more likely that nascent ventures will ultimately develop 
offerings that customers are willing to pay for (Sawyerr et al., 2003). In this context, customer 
feedback is a resource that entrepreneurs use to learn how to better align their offerings with the 
reality of what customers want and need (Gruner and Homburg, 2000; Yli-Renko et al., 2001). 
H1: Early customer involvement is positively related to making the first sale. 
According to Jeff Immelt, Chairman and CEO of General Electric, “entrepreneurs are 
different in many ways … but they also share certain traits. They are fast. They embrace new 
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thinking. They are geared for disruption and innovation through uncertainty” (Ries, 2011: ix). 
Despite this characterization, however, not all entrepreneurs seek to develop innovative 
products/services. In fact, the overwhelming majority of businesses have low rates of innovation 
and operate in established markets (Kirchhoff, 1994). According to Shane (2000), in such cases 
the entrepreneurs’ past work experiences and education, coupled with publicly-available 
information that is disseminated broadly, can provide the knowledge necessary to sufficiently 
understand customer problems and serve markets, a point which Blank (2006: 21) acknowledges: 
“an existing market is pretty easy to understand … the users and the market are known.” 
However, those entrepreneurs that do decide to introduce innovative products or services unlike 
those currently in the market are likely to face considerable uncertainty about the perceived value 
of their offering (Knight, 1921) given that customers may not readily understand it and/or the 
underlying problem it is intended to solve (Shepherd et al., 2000). Taken together, we contend 
that learning from customers will become more important to the entrepreneur the more 
innovative the offering. 
H2: The positive relationship between early customer involvement and making the 
first sale is strengthened as innovativeness increases. 
2.2. The costs of learning from customers 
While learning what customers want and need is important to the entrepreneurial process, 
so too is the speed with which that knowledge is obtained for at least two reasons. First, because 
entrepreneurial opportunities are fleeting (Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Lévesque, Minniti and 
Shepherd, 2013) and change over time in substantive ways (Dimov, 2007b; McMullen and 
Dimov, 2013; Shepherd, 2015), “once a firm is behind, it is difficult to catch up” (Eisenhardt, 
1989: 570). Second, because most entrepreneurs enter the startup process in a resource-poor 
condition (Aldrich, 2000), the longer they persist without revenues, the less likely they are to 
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survive (Lichtenstein, Dooley and Lumpkin, 2006).  In support, Ries (2011: 20, emphasis added) 
notes that “the goal of a startup is to figure out the right thing to build – the thing customers want 
and will pay for – as quickly as possible.” Unfortunately, getting out of the building in order to 
involve customers in product development efforts is a time-intensive process. Given that startups 
tend to have small teams and few, if any, employees (Jin et al., 2017), time spent on customer 
involvement must generally be undertaken by the founders, who cannot dedicate full-time to this 
task given the myriad other roles they must perform in order to sustain their ventures (Wagner, 
2006). Moreover, even once new knowledge is acquired, it is not immediately useful to the 
startup. Instead, it must be processed and integrated with existing knowledge before it can be 
applied to products and services in productive ways (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001; Huber, 1991).  
H3: Early customer involvement is negatively related to the speed to the first sale. 
Despite Blank’s universal advocacy of involving customers in the startups process, he 
does acknowledge that the innovativeness of a startup’s offering will affect the time it takes the 
startup to learn what it needs to know from customers. As Blank (2006: 22) elaborates, for 
startups in existing markets producing incrementally innovative products, “this process ought to 
be a snap, and can be accomplished in a matter of weeks or months;” however, for startups in 
new markets producing radically innovative products “completing the Customer Development 
processes may take a year or two or even longer.” The main reason for this nuance is that 
customers often have more difficulty clearly and easily articulating their wants and needs where 
innovative offerings are concerned (Shane, 2000). In support, research suggests that time to 
market increases with the novelty of the product (Tatikonda and Montoya-Weiss, 2001).  
H4: The negative relationship between early customer involvement and the speed 





We test our hypotheses with the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics II (PSED II), a 
randomized, longitudinal dataset of individuals from the United States involved in the process of 
starting for-profit businesses. These individuals were identified from a random-digit-dialing 
telephone survey of 31,845 adults in the United States conducted between September 2005 and 
February 2006. From this target population, nascent entrepreneurs, or individuals who have 
initiated activities intended to culminate in a viable for-profit businesses (Aldrich, 2000, p. 77), 
were identified as respondents that were [1] were trying to start their own business (for 
themselves or for their employer), [2] expected to be owners or part owners of the new firm, 
which would not be majority owned by another business, [3] were active in trying to start the 
new firm within the previous twelve months, and [4] were still in the startup phase (Reynolds & 
Curtin, 2007). From this initial screening sample, 1,214 nascent entrepreneurs were identified. 
Six telephone interviews were then conducted with these individuals at roughly yearly intervals, 
concluding in April 2011, in order to obtain ongoing information concerning the conditions 
surrounding their startups. For our analysis, we select only the 591 nascent entrepreneurs who 
responded that they had a product/service completed and ready for sale by the time of the final 
interview in order to avoid right censoring (Yang and Aldrich, 2012). 
3.2. Measurement model 
Following Gartner, Carter and Reynolds (2004), we rely on the following item to 
measure our two sales-related dependent variables: “Has this new business already received any 
money, income, or fees from the sale of goods or services?” We operationalize first sale as a 
dummy variable, with cases assigned a value of one if they responded “yes” to this item at any 
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point during the data collection process, and zero otherwise. We operationalize speed to first sale 
as the number of months from the time the entrepreneur first conceived of the idea for the 
business until the time at which the first sale was made. Due to the skewed nature of this 
variable, we log-transform it in order to normalize the distribution. Finally, following Capelleras 
et al. (2010), we then multiply this variable by -1 in order to provide an intuitive measure of 
speed, where higher values represent faster speeds and lower values represent slower speeds. 
To measure customer involvement, we turn to Dimov (2010), who identifies respondents 
in the PSED II that involved customers in the startup process using the following item: “Has an 
effort been made to talk with potential customers about the product or service of this new 
business?” Following Dimov’s (2010) lead, we rely on this item as a foundation; however, 
because we are interested not just in whether entrepreneurs involved customers, but also when 
they did so, we operationalize early customer involvement by comparing the time at which the 
entrepreneur indicated talking with customers with the time at which the entrepreneur indicated 
having made the first sale (Gartner, Carter & Reynolds, 2004). We assign a value of one to 
respondents that talked to customers before the product/service was completed and ready for sale 
(i.e., those that involved customers during the product development process), and zero otherwise.  
Following prior studies using the PSED II (Hopp and Stephan, 2012; Tornikoski and 
Renko, 2014) and its close relative, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Reynolds et al. 2005), 
we measure innovativeness using the following item: “Will all, some, or none of your potential 
customers consider this product or service new and unfamiliar?” We code responses as follows: 
1 = none, 2 = some, 3 = all. Given that we multiply our independent and moderator variables in 
order to create our interaction term, we center both at their means. Finally, we control for a host 
of factors that may also affect the likelihood of and/or the speed to making a sale (see Table 1). 
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----- Insert Table 1 here ----- 
4. Analysis and results 
We use logit regression to test H1 and H2 given the dichotomous nature of our first 
dependent variable (first sale). Yet, because not all entrepreneurs made a sale, we use a Heckman 
sample selection model to test H3 and H4 (predicting speed to first sale) in order to control for 
selection bias by simultaneously estimating [1] the likelihood that the entrepreneur made a sale 
(selection model) and, for those that have, [2] the speed with which they have done so (effects 
model). An important condition of the Heckman procedure is that the vector of explanatory 
variables in the selection model differs from that in the effects model (Winship & Mare, 1992). 
Thus, we include household income as a control variable in the selection model only, assuming it 
provides entrepreneurs the personal resources needed to help fund the development of the 
product to be sold, and industry experience in the effects model only, assuming it provides 
entrepreneurs with a deeper understanding of the context in which they will sell their products, 
thereby enabling them to reach that milestone more quickly. As a final point, in conducting our 
regression analyses, we weight the data using the weights created by the University of Michigan 
Institute for Social Research. Based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey conducted by 
the United States Census Bureau, these weights correct for differences in selection probabilities 
and differential non-response rates so that the estimated results are representative of and, 
therefore, generalizable to the United States population (Reynolds & Curtin, 2008).  
5. Results 
We report descriptive statistics and correlations for the model variables in Table 2. These 
statistics, along with a visual inspection of the data, suggest that all variables are normally 
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distributed. Moreover, all correlation coefficients are sufficiently low enough to alleviate any 
concerns that multicollinearity that might confound the results of our subsequent statistical tests.  
----- Insert Table 2 here ----- 
Tables 3 and 4 show decreases in both the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and the -
2 log likelihoods from the control models to the full models. Further, we observe significant 
likelihood ratio tests as the independent variables and interaction terms are added to the models. 
Based on these statistics, we conclude that all models fit the data well and that each subsequent 
model fits the data significantly better than the preceding models.  
Table 3 reports the results of the hypotheses predicting first sale. Model 2 shows that 
early customer involvement is positively related to making the first sale (β = 0.67, p = 0.03), 
suggesting support for H1. Model 3 shows that the interaction term is significant (β = 0.94, p = 
0.05) and a subsequent plot of this interaction (Figure 1) illustrates that while involving 
customers early has almost no effect on making the first sale when innovativeness is low, it has a 
large positive effect when innovativeness is high, suggesting support for H2.  
----- Insert Table 3 and Figure 1 here ----- 
Table 4 reports the results of the hypotheses predicting the speed to first sale. As Model 2 
shows, early customer involvement is negatively related to speed to the first sale (β = –0.63, p = 
0.001), suggesting support for H3. Model 3 shows that the interaction term is significant (β = –
0.59, p = 0.01) and a subsequent plot of this interaction (Figure 2) illustrates that while early 
customer involvement reduces the speed to the first sale in conditions of low innovativeness, it 
reduces that speed even further in conditions of high innovativeness, suggesting support for H4. 




In this study, we present a theoretical explanation for how, why, and under what 
conditions getting out of the building ought to both facilitate and hinder the startup process. In 
testing our model on large sample of nascent entrepreneurs, we find that while involving 
customers during product development helps generate initial sales, it also increases the time it 
takes to make those sales. Moreover, we find that these benefits and costs are magnified when 
innovativeness is high. Thus, despite the global support for customer involvement as a magic 
bullet for nascent entrepreneurs, it actually appears to be a double-edged sword. While this 
conclusion may seem surprising at first blush, when one considers that those advocating 
involving customers (Blank, 2006; Ries, 2011) developed their models without any theoretical or 
empirical justification, it is perhaps not surprising at all. It is for this very reason that we believe 
our study can help bolster these models and, in turn, inform academics and entrepreneurs alike.  
To begin, while prior research in the area has invoked a learning perspective (Mansoori, 
2017), it has focused on the value of learning about customer involvement as one component of 
the larger Lean Startup approach. While insightful, we extend such work by focusing on the 
value of learning from customers themselves during the startup process and, in so doing, provide 
the first theoretical justification for why getting out of the building can facilitate the cash flows 
so desperately needed by resource-poor nascent entrepreneurs. Furthermore, our hypothesis 
predicting the speed to first sale and our contingency hypotheses addressing innovativeness, 
establish important boundary conditions that help begin to define the limits of customer 
involvement. Of course, there are likely other theoretical lenses and contingencies that may also 
prove useful in understanding customer involvement and so we encourage scholars to consider 
them in future research so as to continue to build our knowledge of this important phenomenon. 
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The generation of such knowledge, however, ought not be limited to academic circles. 
Indeed, given their limited resource profile, coupled with the overwhelming constraints on their 
time, entrepreneurs themselves would benefit from a better understanding of the benefits and 
costs of getting out of the building This is particularly important given Blank’s (2013) claim that  
Lean Startup techniques were initially designed to create fast-growing tech 
ventures. But I believe the concepts are equally valid for creating the Main Street 
small businesses that make up the bulk of the economy. If the entire universe of 
small businesses embraced them, I strongly suspect it would increase growth and 
efficiency. (p. 70)  
Yet, our findings suggest that for most entrepreneurs, involving customers may have only limited 
value given that their prior knowledge can likely provide a sufficient foundation for 
understanding customer wants and needs (Shane, 2000). Yet, even when new knowledge from 
customers is required to understand how to exploit more innovative opportunities, we find that 
this learning comes at a significant cost. Thus, while we agree that getting out of the building can 
yield meaningful benefits to entrepreneurs, we would at the same time advise them to approach 
customer involvement cautiously and with an appreciation of the costs as well.  
While we believe the support we find for our hypotheses sheds new light on the benefits 
and costs of customer involvement in the startup process, we advise readers to accept our 
findings with the following three caveats in mind. First, we did not distinguish between whether 
the products/services the nascent entrepreneurs in our sample were developing were demand- or 
supply-driven given our contention that both ought to benefit from customer involvement. 
However, to the extent that customer involvement might operate differently in each case, we 
advise future scholars to explore these potential nuances.  Second, our measure of innovativeness 
is based on the entrepreneur’s assessment of how customers would view the product/service and 
not the customer’s own assessment. While this measure has precedent (Hopp and Stephan, 2012; 
Reynolds et al. 2005; Tornikoski and Renko, 2014), we acknowledge the possibility that 
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customers and entrepreneurs may view what is (not) innovative differently. Although measuring 
customer perceptions directly is not feasible in the PSED II, we encourage future scholars to 
consider collecting data from customers.  Finally, while this research represents a rigorous 
assessment of customer involvement, it should not be interpreted as a test of the Customer 
Development or Lean Startup approaches given that both consist of multiple elements. That said, 
given the central role customer involvement plays in both, our findings should at the very least 
cause us to question whether these methods apply universally (Blank, 2013).  
7. Conclusion 
This study represents an important step forward in the discussion around customer 
involvement. Not only does it provide insight into the role customer involvement can play in the 
startup process, but more importantly, it highlights the valuable role scientific inquiry can play in 
the development of managerial advice more generally. Rather than merely accept ideas as viable 
solutions to problems based on anecdotes and/or intuitive appeal, academics have a larger 
responsibility as skeptics to explain and test those ideas for rigor and generalizability, confirming 
or rejecting the underlying assumptions on which they are based and identifying their boundary 
conditions. Unfortunately, the institutionalization of customer involvement in entrepreneurship 
education at business schools across the globe (including those where the authors work) suggests 
that we, as a community, need to do a better job. It is our hope that by leveraging theory to 
hypothesize about both the benefits and the costs of customer involvement, and by subsequently 
subjecting those hypotheses to rigorous empirical testing with a large-scale, randomized dataset, 
we are not only able to evaluate the customer involvement approach with an appropriately 
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Table 1. Control variables 
Variable Operationalization 
Gender  Female (1), male (0) 
Education At least a 4-year degree (1), less than a 4-year degree (0) 
Race  Dummy variables: White, Hispanic, Black (reference group), Other  
Age Years (logged) 
Startup experience Number of new ventures previously started (logged) 
Industry experience Number of years of previous experience in the industry in which the new venture will operate (logged) 
Household income U.S. dollars (logged) 
Social motive Starting the business in order to help others and/or aid the economy/economic development (1), or not (0) 
Local environment  Dummy variables: Urban, Suburban, Rural (reference group) 





Table 2. Descriptives and correlations 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
dev. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
1 Gender (female) 0.420 0.493                                      
2 Education 0.390 0.488 0.088 *                   
3 Race (other) 0.059 0.236 0.027  -0.084 *                 
4 Race (Hispanic) 0.128 0.334 -0.066  -0.094 * -0.096 *               
5 Race (white) 0.630 0.484 -0.066  0.078  -0.326 * -0.498 *             
6 Race (black) 0.160 0.367 0.139 * 0.020  -0.109 * -0.167 * -0.567 *           
7 Age 3.632 0.323 0.036  0.236 * -0.050  -0.075  0.139 * -0.079          
8 Startup experience 0.427 0.588 -0.002  0.186 * 0.036  -0.038  0.029  -0.047  0.308 *       
9 Industry experience 1.6027 1.143 0.192 * 0.039  0.057  -0.042  0.052  -0.073  0.288 * 0.118 *     
10 Household income 10.968 0.868 -0.112 * 0.229 * -0.048  -0.047  0.121 * -0.099 * 0.121 * 0.201 * 0.025    
11 Social motive 0.060 0.237 -0.044  -0.087  0.086 * 0.045  -0.094 * 0.014  0.076  -0.015  -0.005  -0.035  
12 Context (urban) 0.356 0.479 -0.025  0.005  0.018  0.118 * -0.245 * 0.162 * 0.015  -0.067  -0.003  0.052  
13 Context (suburban) 0.414 0.493 0.020  0.110 * -0.042  0.004  0.063  -0.040  -0.023  0.029  -0.004  0.045  
14 Context (rural) 0.230 0.421 0.005  -0.134 * 0.028  -0.139 * 0.205 * -0.137 * 0.010  0.043  0.008  -0.112 * 
15 Region (Northeast) 0.170 0.376 -0.013  0.008  0.070  -0.073  0.010  -0.016  0.009  -0.016  0.085 * 0.036  
16 Region (Midwest) 0.212 0.409 -0.038  -0.112 * -0.095 * -0.022  0.097 * -0.029  -0.024  -0.088 * -0.012  -0.121 * 
17 Region (West) 0.241 0.428 -0.005  0.060  0.080  0.116 * 0.007  -0.186 * 0.071  0.127 * -0.018  0.049  
18 Region (South) 0.377 0.485 0.046  0.035  -0.044  -0.028  -0.096 * 0.201 * -0.050  -0.026  -0.040  0.033  
19 Innovativeness 0.000 0.658 0.006  0.075  0.007  -0.040  -0.031  0.067  0.061  0.021  -0.023  0.001  
20 Early customer involvement 0.000 0.484 0.072  0.117  -0.014  -0.151 * 0.071  0.019  0.016  0.013  0.047  0.091  
21 First sale 0.839 0.368 0.031  0.026  -0.080  -0.076  0.124 * -0.057  -0.017  0.070  0.085 * 0.054  
22 Time to first sale -2.361 1.395 0.024  0.010  -0.089  0.048  -0.004  0.020  -0.083  0.029  -0.077  -0.005  





Table 2. Descriptives and correlations (continued) 
Variable 11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
1 Gender (female)                      
2 Education                      
3 Race (other)                      
4 Race (Hispanic)                      
5 Race (white)                      
6 Race (black)                      
7 Age                      
8 Startup experience                      
9 Industry experience                      
10 Household income                      
11 Social motive                      
12 Context (urban) 0.093 *                    
13 Context (suburban) -0.139 * -0.625 *                  
14 Context (rural) 0.057  -0.406 * -0.460 *                
15 Region (Northeast) 0.022  -0.037  0.083 * -0.055               
16 Region (Midwest) 0.007  0.038  -0.117 * 0.094 * -0.235 *            
17 Region (West) 0.035  0.031  0.041  -0.083 * -0.256 * -0.292 *          
18 Region (South) -0.054  -0.030  -0.002  0.037  -0.352 * -0.403 * -0.438 *        
19 Innovativeness 0.093 * 0.056  0.008  -0.073  -0.046  0.040  0.071  -0.061       
20 Early customer involvement 0.002  0.063  -0.008  -0.063  0.070  0.060  -0.023  -0.085 * 0.006     
21 First sale -0.017  -0.040  -0.034  0.085  -0.120 * -0.024  0.004  0.109 * -0.108 * 0.084 *  
22 Time to first sale -0.066  -0.054  0.139  -0.098  0.029  0.051  0.039  -0.098 * 0.145 * -0.196 * n/a1 
* p  < 0.05                     




Table 3. Weighted logit regression: First sale 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable       
Intercept 2.06  0.03  0.15  
Gender 0.22  0.15  0.08  
Education -0.12  -0.20  -0.22  
Race (other) -0.01  0.23  0.21  
Race (Hispanic) -0.31  -0.03  -0.07  
Race (white) 0.80 * 0.90 * 0.86 * 
Age -0.40  -0.17  -0.26  
Startup experience 0.13  -0.01  -0.05  
Household income  0.15  0.31  0.34  
Social motive 0.06  0.00  -0.17  
Context (urban) -0.59  -0.92 * -0.99 * 
Context (suburban) -0.58  -0.57  -0.62  
Region (Northeast) -1.28 *** -1.76 *** -1.67 *** 
Region (Midwest) -0.80 * -1.12 ** -1.09 ** 
Region (West) -0.42  -0.86 * -0.89 * 
Innovativeness -0.39 * -0.43 * -0.10  
Early customer involvement   0.67 * 0.70 * 
Innovativeness*early customer involvement     0.94 * 
Model fit       
AIC 438.63  390.48  388.48  
-2 log likelihood 445.09  409.72  409.72  
Likelihood ratio test   29.557 *** 7.99 ** 
Maximum likelihood estimation method 
N= 500 





Table 4. Weighted Heckman regression – effects model: Speed to first sale 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable       
     Intercept -0.82  -0.97  -1.13  
Gender 0.07  0.10  0.13  
Education 0.01  0.12  0.12  
Race (other) -0.58  -0.57  -0.52  
Race (Hispanic) 0.21  0.01  0.08  
Race (white) -0.10  -0.14  -0.09  
Age -0.50 * -0.49 * -0.47 * 
Industry experience -0.03  -0.02  -0.01  
Startup experience 0.19  0.19  0.21  
Social motive -0.45  -0.35  -0.32  
Context (urban) 0.01  0.15  0.18  
Context (suburban) 0.40 * 0.45 * 0.48 ** 
Region (Northeast) 0.49 * 0.60 * 0.57 * 
Region (Midwest) 0.32  0.43 * 0.42 * 
Region (West) 0.19  0.27  0.29  
Innovativeness 0.33 ** 0.33 ** 0.19  
Early customer involvement   -0.63 *** -0.72 *** 
Innovativeness*early customer involvement     -0.59 ** 
Model fit       
AIC 2040  1904  1898  
-2 log likelihood 492.88  458.455  456.58  
Likelihood ratio test   137.70 *** 7.50 ** 
Maximum likelihood estimation method 
N= 535 
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